Backdoors Are a Very Bad Idea 

End-to-end encryption ought to be table stakes for communication wherever possible.

The FBI has long waged an anti-encryption campaign, seeking to mandate the creation of backdoors into end-to-end encrypted communications like WhatsApp, Signal, and Apple’s iMessages. In their fantasy, these backdoors would be accessible only to law enforcement, and could otherwise never be exploited. To gin up support, they amplified the specter of child exploitation and spouted nonsense terms like “lawful access”, all in the hopes of convincing people that a “safe backdoor” wasn’t a complete and utter contradiction in terms.

But make no mistake about it, there are no safe backdoors.

Consider this analogy. You are the parent of a seven-year-old mischief-maker. You tell the child, “I’m leaving the house for an hour. There is a bag of candy hidden somewhere, but don’t look for it because it’s so well hidden you cannot ever find it.”

Of course, the child is going to do exactly what you expect and search for the candy. The same principle applies to creating a backdoor for the government in encryption. When bad actors are told there’s a government-mandated backdoor, they’re going to search for it if they know it exists. Even if it’s just to prove they could find the impossible only for bragging rights. Eventually, someone will find it. And once that door is open, it’s almost impossible to close it.

We’re now learning that China has penetrated America’s telecommunications systems deeply, in a breathtaking hack whose scope is still being revealed. It appears this was accomplished using backdoors mandated back in 1994 for use by law enforcement. This should not be surprising. When it comes to backdoors being exploited maliciously, it’s a matter of “when”, not “if”.

As a result of this hack, government officials are making an abrupt about-face. Americans are now being urged to use encrypted communications whenever possible. That is a good idea.